https://mandgard.io/ 2026-11-06 monthly 1.0 https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_demo_poster.jpg MandGard OASIS: live demonstration on a real Siemens LOGO! controller Cold-room scenario on a commercial, unmodified controller: 3 legitimate commands executed, 6 attacks blocked before the controller. English voice-over, captions burned in. https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_demo_en.mp4 153 2026-11-05 yes no https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_bremanger_poster.jpg MandGard OASIS case study: exposed web panel, Norway, April 2025 A hijacked web panel drives a valve and a flow setpoint within their normal range, replayed on a real Siemens LOGO! controller: the valve moves only with two approvals, the flow by one bounded step, 3 attempts blocked. English voice-over, captions burned in. https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_bremanger_en.mp4 133 2026-11-06 yes no https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_hacktivists_poster.jpg MandGard OASIS case study: hijacked operator screens, December 2025 Operator screens left open on the internet push a pressure setpoint out of range, raise an alarm limit and start a pump directly, replayed on a real Siemens LOGO! controller: 3 attacks blocked. English voice-over, captions burned in. https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_hacktivists_en.mp4 121 2026-11-06 yes no https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_native_poster.jpg MandGard OASIS case study: controllers reached through their own protocols Native writes, programming and session requests in the controllers' own industrial protocols, replayed on a real Siemens LOGO! controller: 6 attempts blocked, none forwarded. English voice-over, captions burned in. https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_native_en.mp4 116 2026-11-06 yes no https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_workstation_poster.jpg MandGard OASIS case study: stolen engineering keys An attacker holding a valid signing key and one approval, replayed on a real Siemens LOGO! controller: 4 orders blocked, the line never started, the key revoked in one signed step. English voice-over, captions burned in. https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_workstation_en.mp4 95 2026-11-06 yes no https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_firmware_poster.jpg MandGard OASIS case study: compromised device firmware MandGard cannot see inside a compromised device; on a real Siemens LOGO! controller it refuses to become a path around itself: its host turned into a router is detected, recorded, and service stops until routing is off. English voice-over, captions burned in. https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_firmware_en.mp4 96 2026-11-06 yes no https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_iec62443_poster.jpg MandGard OASIS: IEC TS 62443-6-2 checks against IEC 62443-4-2 Eight IEC 62443-4-2 component requirements checked live in front of a real Siemens LOGO! controller, met by system integration in a vendor rehearsal; not an evaluation, not certified. English voice-over, captions burned in. https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_iec62443_en.mp4 137 2026-11-06 yes no https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_annex119_poster.jpg MandGard OASIS: EU Machinery Regulation, Annex III 1.1.9 Annex III 1.1.9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 checked paragraph by paragraph on the command path of a real Siemens LOGO! controller; hardware tampering evidence not covered. English voice-over, captions burned in. https://mandgard.io/demo/mandgard_case_annex119_en.mp4 120 2026-11-06 yes no